State v. Castrejon Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 44783 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-21-2017
State v. Castrejon Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
44783
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Castrejon Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 44783" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6761.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6761
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 






























REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF GOODING 
________________________ 
 





LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 





BEN P. McGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570 
















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 1 
 
 The District Court Erred Because The Information 
 Charged Felonies For Striking A Police Officer ......................................... 1 
 
 A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 1 
 
 B. The State’s Argument That “Striking” A Law 
  Enforcement Officer Is A Felony Is Preserved 
  In The Record ................................................................................. 1 
 
 C. The Information Charged A Felony By Charging 
  Castrejon With Striking A Law Enforcement Officer ....................... 5 
 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 6 
 






TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Am. Semiconductor., Inc. v. Sage Silicon Sols., LLC, 
 162 Idaho 119, 395 P.3d 338 (2017) ......................................................... 2 
 
Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 
 No. 44053, 2017 WL 2644707 (Idaho June 20, 2017) .............................. 2 
 
Roe v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001) ................................................ 2 
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 864 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1993) ..................... 4, 5 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 117 (1999)............................................ 5 
State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 706 P.2d 456 (1985) .......................................... 4 
State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 716 P.2d 1385 (Ct. App. 1986) .......................... 4 
State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 961 P.2d 1203 (Ct. App. 1998)............................... 4 
State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) .............................. 4 
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30 (2015) ............................................... 6 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-903 ................................................................................................. 1, 5, 6 








The District Court Erred Because The Information Charged Felonies For Striking 




 A battery may be committed by “force or violence … or … touching or 
striking … or … causing bodily harm.”  I.C. § 18-903.  A battery “except unlawful 
touching” committed on a law enforcement officer is, under certain conditions, a 
felony.  I.C. § 18-915(3).  The district court erred when it interpreted the 
legislative exclusion of batteries committed by “touching” an officer, articulated in 
I.C. § 18-915(3), as also excluding batteries committed by “striking” an officer.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.) 
 Responding to this argument, Castrejon contends that the “plain 
language” interpretation of the statute is not a preserved issue and that, if 
applied, it leads to the same result reached by the district court.  (Respondent’s 
brief, pp. 6-11.)  Review of Castrejon’s arguments show they are without merit.  
The state did preserve the argument that the information charged a felony, and 
because the information did charge a felony (even if it also charged a 
misdemeanor) the district court erred. 
 
B. The State’s Argument That “Striking” A Law Enforcement Officer Is A 
Felony Is Preserved In The Record 
 
 Castrejon contends the state did not “preserve” the “plain language 
argument for appeal” because “it did not present that argument to the district 
court.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  Application of the correct legal standards to the 
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record shows that the state did preserve the issue of whether it charged a felony 
by alleging battery on a law enforcement officer by “striking” that officer. 
“The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that 
are raised for the first time on appeal.”  Roe v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 
21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001).  In addition, an adverse ruling is a prerequisite to 
appellate review.  Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 
No. 44053, 2017 WL 2644707, at *6 (Idaho June 20, 2017); Am. 
Semiconductor., Inc. v. Sage Silicon Sols., LLC, 162 Idaho 119, 395 P.3d 338, 
353 (2017), reh’g denied (June 8, 2017).   
 The record shows the district court raised the issue of whether the 
information charged a felony, articulating the issue as follows:  “the defendant in 
both counts is charged with actually, intentionally, and unlawfully touching and/or 
striking the officer, and the question I have is why is that not a misdemeanor 
offense?”  (Tr., p. 3, Ls. 17-21.)  After hearing the arguments of the parties, the 
district court held: 
Given the way that Counts I and II are charged as unlawful 
touching and/or striking, I find that that is the language that is 
excepted out in subsection (3) of 18-915, so I do not believe that 
the Court has jurisdiction over a felony offense, so I’m going to 
remand this matter back to magistrate court for further 
proceedings. 
 
(Tr., p. 7, L. 22 – p. 8, L. 3.)  The issue of whether the language “touching and/or 
striking” a law enforcement officer charged a felony under the applicable statutes 
was thus squarely raised and decided by the district court, and may thus be 
challenged on appeal.   
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 Castrejon contends the state’s “argument” of how the information charges 
a felony is different on appeal.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 6-9.)  Other than pointing 
out that some of the words used are different, however, Castrejon has failed to 
support this contention from the record.  Below, the state argued that inclusion of 
misdemeanor language in the charges was in the nature of a “clerical error” and 
potential flaws in the language had been discussed with defense counsel.  (Tr., 
p. 3, L. 22 – p. 4, L. 9.)  Defense counsel represented that in discussions with 
the prosecution he had “pointed out that unlawful touching is a misdemeanor” 
but concluded that he still believed the language was sufficient even though it 
“definitely has the misdemeanor language in it.”  (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 11-23.)  The 
prosecutor, in further colloquy with the court, pointed out that the facts would 
show that “more than touching was done,” that the misdemeanor of touching 
could be considered a “lesser included” offense of the felony, and, noting that he 
did not have the “statute in front of [him],” that the “striking” language was 
sufficient to charge the felony.  (Tr., p. 4, L. 24 – p. 6, L. 12.)  Although the brief 
on appeal was prepared with a 35-day deadline and is therefore more articulate 
than the oral argument of the prosecutor when the issue was sprung on him in 
court, the state’s position has always been that the inclusion of misdemeanor 
language regarding “touching” as an “and/or” alternative (“lesser included”) to the 
felony of “striking” was not a fatal defect in the charging document.  The issue of 
whether the state properly charged a felony by striking “striking and/or touching” 
is preserved in this record, and the state’s argument that the allegation that 
striking a law enforcement officer charges a felony is also preserved. 
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 Castrejon next argues that the state invited the district court to 
erroneously conclude the information failed to charge a felony.  (Respondent’s 
brief, pp. 9-10.)  This argument likewise does not withstand analysis. 
“The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an 
error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error.”  State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. 
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)).  “One may 
not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in.”  Norton, 
151 Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 
706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 
1208 (Ct. App. 1998)).  A party “may not request a particular ruling by the trial 
court and later argue on appeal that the ruling was erroneous.”  State v. Griffith, 
110 Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 1986).   
The portion of the transcript Castrejon relies on, presented in context, is 
as follows: 
 THE COURT: Well, but subsection (1) of—or subsection (a) 
charges a battery as force or violence.  Subsection (2) is 
touching—unlawful touching or striking.  Subsection (3) is causing 
bodily injury. So isn’t subsection (2) the language that the 
legislature has excepted out as far as the felony’s concerned? 
 
MR. ASH: Well, I think I would have to agree with the Court 
there that, yes, that is the case, but, as I mentioned, the language 
in our lnformation was a clerical—obviously, not one without 
impact, but it was a clerical error. 
 
(Tr., p. 6, Ls. 13-24 (cited in part Respondent’s brief, p. 9).)  Castrejon’s reading 
of this statement of agreement with the court—as abandoning or refuting the 
previously made argument that although there was misdemeanor language in 
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the charge it was a clerical error that could be treated as an included offense and 
that the “striking” language was sufficient to charge a felony—is untenable.  Even 
if the prosecutor expressed some agreement with the district court’s analysis, 
such “concurrence did not invite the court” to hold that the information did not 
charge a felony.  State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999) 
(statement “we would concur” after court announced intent to give particular 
instruction did not invite any error in giving that instruction).  The record simply 
does not support a claim that the state’s “own conduct induce[d] the commission 
of the error.”  Atkinson, 124 Idaho at 819, 864 P.2d at 657. 
 The state has consistently maintained, contrary to the district court’s 
holding, that the charges of “striking” the officers are felonies, even if they also 
included misdemeanor language about “touching.”  Castrejon’s argument that 
the state waived or forfeited that issue is without merit. 
 
C. The Information Charged A Felony By Charging Castrejon With Striking A 
Law Enforcement Officer 
 
 The plain language of the applicable statutes is that a battery by 
“touching” a law enforcement officer is not a felony, but battery on a law 
enforcement officer in any other form, including “striking,” is a felony.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6 (citing I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-915(3)).)  Castrejon argues 
that by excepting “touching” from the types of battery that are elevated to a 
felony when committed on a law enforcement officer, the legislature necessarily 
excepted “striking” because “striking” appears in the same subsection of I.C. 
§ 18-903 as “touching.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 11.)  The argument that by 
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specifically exempting “touching” set forth in I.C. § 18-903(b), without mentioning 
“striking” as set forth in the same subsection, the legislature meant to exempt 
both forms of battery makes no legal, grammatical, or logical sense.  It is 
certainly contrary to the plain language of the statute.  State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 
1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015) (“When the statute’s language is unambiguous, the 
legislature’s clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and we do not need to 
go beyond the statute’s plain language to consider other rules of statutory 
construction.”).  If the legislature meant to exclude “striking” an officer from the 
forms of battery that constitute the felony, in addition to excluding “touching” an 
officer, it could have done so in a number of ways that make linguistic and logical 
sense.  The statutory language excludes only “touching” and does not exclude 
“striking” or any other form of battery.  By the statute’s plain language, only 
“touching” an officer is excluded, and therefore “striking” a law enforcement 




 The state requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order 
remanding the case to the magistrate division and that this Court remand the 
case for further proceedings on the felony charges of battery on a law 
enforcement officer. 
 DATED this 21st day of July, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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